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THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT: UNMET EXPECTATIONS?
Herbert E. Cihake
I. STEPS TOWARD ELECTION LAW REFORM
Federal involvement in state election law matters did not begin with an
infamous 2000 Florida case.' Congress and our courts have been entangled
in the political thicket of election law issues since at least the early 1960s, as
evidenced by congressional legislation that supports fair voting practices
and equal access to voting processes,2 as well as United States Supreme
Court cases that have rearranged the United States electoral landscape.'
Without the aftermath of the 2000 Presidential election, however, there
would have been no urgency in passing the Help America Vote Act 2002
(HAVA).4
* Herbert Cihak is Associate Dean, Library and Information Services and Professor of
Law at Pepperdine University School of Law in Malibu, California.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (finding that standards and procedures for
counting a vote must be resolved to comport with equal protection and due process require-
ments).
2. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-1 (1965); Voting Acces-
sibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee-1973ee6 (1984); Un-
iformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (co-
dified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); National Voter Registra-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.); Rehabilitation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
3. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion)
(providing comments regarding the political thicket). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 (1964) (establishing that state legislatures must be apportioned on an equal one
person, one vote standard); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) (requiring con-
gressional districts to be drawn on an equal population basis); and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 209-10 (1962) (holding that challenges to malapportioned districts under the Equal
Protection Clause were justiciable). Reynolds, Wesberry, and Baker all set the stage for an
eight-fold increase in the number of election law cases that wound their way to the United
States Supreme Court between 1910 and 1980. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER v. CARR TO BUSH V.
GORE (2003) for a detailed analysis of this trend.
4. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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II. FLORIDA AS A CATALYST
The State of Florida became ground zero on November 2, 2000 as ini-
tial ballot tallies began to be reported. It quickly became obvious that
whoever won Florida's twenty five electoral votes-Vice President Al Gore
or Texas Governor George W. Bush-would become the nation's forty-third
president. National attention shifted to Palm Beach County's bizarre butterf-
ly ballots, Miami-Dade County's 10,000 undervotes, Volusia County's ma-
chine-related problems, and the use of punch card voting machines in Bro-
ward County. Then truckloads of political operatives and lawyers flocked to
the Sunshine State.5 For nearly a month, the American public witnessed the
spectacle of election workers with magnifying glasses trying to decipher
voter intent by examining hanging, dimpled, and pregnant voting card
chads. This national debacle was called to a halt on December 12, 2000,
when the United States Supreme Court intervened.6 The 2000 Florida elec-
tion fiasco, however, left many United States citizens seething, and a gener-
al public outcry for some kind of election law reform was sounded.7 Con-
gress was left with no recourse but to act on election law reform legislation.8
III. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
Election law reform measures were quickly introduced in both the
United States House of Representatives and in the United States Senate dur-
ing the opening of the 107th Congressional legislative session that began in
January 2001. 9 A bipartisan reform measure, H.R. 3295, was passed in the
5. For background information on aspects of this election see ABNER GREENE,
UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATrLES THAT DECIDED THE
PRESIDENCY (200 1).
6. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000).
7. Many private organizations conducted election reform research and proposed sug-
gestions for election law reform. Probably no group was more influential than the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform. This group was organized by the Miller Center of
Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Century Foundation. Several foundations
provided this organization with funding. Former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford
served as honorary co-chairs, and politicos Robert Michel and Lloyd Cutler served as co-
chairs. Recommendations from this report were used as a foundation for much of the specific
HAVA legislation. See THE NAT'L COMM. ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, To ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (2001).
8. For a general overview of the HAVA provisions and the State of Arkansas's re-
sponse, see Herbert E. Cihak & Jason Springman, HA VA and Arkansas Election Law Reform:
Compliance and Promise, 2006 ARK. L. NOTES 1.
9. In the words of one proponent, congressional reform would address three "funda-
mental principles: One, that every eligible citizen shall have the right to vote. Two, that no
legal vote will be canceled by an illegal vote. Three, that every vote will be counted equally
and fairly, according to the law." See 148 CONG. REC. H20315 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Ney).
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House in December of 2001.10 After lengthy deliberations, the Senate passed
S. 565 on April 11, 2002." One of HAVA's Senate co-sponsors, Senator
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, commented on the significance of the
historic state-federal election reform partnership that had been forged:
We, by no means, intend to supplant the traditional role that [s]tate and
local governments have played administering elections for Federal of-
fice. But, for the first time, with this legislation, the Congress-[t]he
Federal Government-will set basic minimum requirements and provide
critical resources for Federal elections .... For the very first time, the
Federal Government will become a real partner with [s]tate and local
governments in the administration of Federal elections .... For the very
first time, again, the Congress and the Federal Government will start
paying their fair share of the cost of administering elections for Federal
office. 12
The final version of the election law reform package was passed by the
House on October 10, 2002,13 and in the Senate on October 16, 2002.14 Pres-
ident George W. Bush signed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)
into law on October 29, 2002."5 But it would take well over a year for provi-
sions of this act to be transformed into an organized governmental entity
with staff and funding. 6
The crux of the problem that Democrats and Republicans had in getting
together on the HAVA election law reform was identified in early 2001 leg-
islative skirmishes and has continued to be emphasized in succeeding devel-
opments: the issue of potential voting fraud. Democrats (and their liberal
supporters) have taken the position that voting fraud does not exist, or if it
does exist its impact and consequences are of little effect and usually the
10. 147 CONG. REC. S13764-13771 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001). HAVA was originally
supported by a wide ranging group of political and social organizations including the follow-
ing: the National Commission on Federal Election Reform (Ford-Carter Commission); Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures; National Association of Secretaries of State; National
Association of Counties; The Election Center; National Federation of the Blind; Common
Cause; National Association of State Election Directors; United Auto Workers; AFL-CIO;
NAACP; American Foundation for the Blind; National Association of Protection Advocacy
Systems; and United Cerebral Palsy Association. See 148 CONG. REc. H20317 (daily ed.
2002).
11. 148 CONG. REc. S4410 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2002).
12. 148 CONG. REC. S709-03 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
13. 148 CONG. REC. H1204-05 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
14. 148 CONG. REC. S20860 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002).
15. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 1666 Stat. 116 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).




result of inadvertent election worker mistakes and administrator errors.' 7
Consequently, they believe that there is no need to enact photo identification
measures or to create additional security devices which could act as voting
accessibility impediments and which could impose disproportionate burdens
and costs on minority and elderly voters. 8 On the other hand, Republicans
(and their conservative base) have continued to brandish the election fraud
or corruption saber. 9 As a consequence, they generally have supported leg-
islation which would impose stricter voting identification and voting securi-
ty requirements. 20 For them, the issue of safeguarding election law integrity
is essential to the viability of this democracy. The difference between the
17. See LORI MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, SECURING THE VOTE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ELECTION FRAUD, (2003). The authors of this report state that "there have been no major
studies of election fraud in the United States," and that "[t]oo often, hearsay and anecdotal
stories are put forth as fact during critical policy deliberations." Id. at 9. In a March 2007
introduction to a publication sponsored by Project Vote, Lorraine C. Minnite wrote further
that: "The claim that voter fraud threatens the integrity of American elections is itself a fraud.
It is being used to persuade the public that deceitful and criminal voters are manipulating the
electoral system. No available evidence suggests that voters are intentionally corrupting the
electoral process .... With renewed partisan vigor fantasies of fraud are being spun again to
undo some of the progress America has made lowering the barriers to vote." LORRAINE C.
MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 5 (2007).
18. While Democratic constituencies have attacked constrictive photo ID requirements
for voting, they also have sought to expand the electoral franchise in a number of ways. In
February 2007, the New York Coalition to Expand Voting Rights called on New York City
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg to allow legal immigrants, but who are not citizens, to vote in
local elections. This coalition represented more than sixty diverse organizations including the
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the
Community Service Society, and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. See
Sewell Chan, Alliance Backs Voting Rights for Noncitizens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007.
19. The United States Senate Republican Policy Committee issued a report in February
2005 which stated that "[v]oter fraud continues to plague our nation's federal elections."
United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, Putting an End to Voter Fraud (Feb. 15,
2005), available at http://rpc.senate.gov/ files/Feb 1 504VoterFraudSD.pdf. This report urged
Congress to address the problem of voter fraud that had been identified in the HAVA legisla-
tion, and outlined three steps that should be taken in order to "protect the election process
from those who would undermine our democracy." Id. These steps included the following:
"First, Congress should require that voters at the polls show photo identification. Second,
Congress should examine the integrity of the voter registration process .... Third, Congress
should examine the extent to which early and absentee voting increases the likelihood of
fraudulent votes being cast." Id. (emphasis omitted). To reinforce the Republican position on
voter fraud, Senator Mitch McConnell introduced S. 414 on February 17, 2005, entitled
"Voter Protection Act of 2005." Provisions of this bill amended the Help America Vote Act
2002 by incorporating the anti-fraud steps from the United States Senate Republican Policy
Committee Report. See 148 CONG. REC. S 1625 (daily ed. 2005).
20. Republican photo identification legislation in Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, and
Florida has touched off a firestorm of protests and an abundance of lawsuits as these enact-
ments have wound their way through the judicial system. Several other states, including
Texas, stand poised to pass photo identification measures.
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philosophies that the two parties have towards elections and election law
reform, however, is more than just a difference in the perception of what
constitutes voting fraud. While voter fraud is the buzz word at the center of
this disagreement, what the clash really boils down to is a matter of voting
ballot access versus voting ballot security, and this ideological divide does
not seem to be narrowing with the passage of time. For both parties the po-
litical stakes are too high to concede much ground.
IV. HAVA-PURPOSE AND PROMISE
There is little doubt that congressional action was an attempt to fix the
problems spotlighted by the 2000 election debacle in Florida. The 2002
House Conference Report described HAVA's purpose in this way:
To establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card
voting systems, to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist
in the administration of Federal elections and to otherwise provide assis-
tance with the administration of certain Federal election laws and pro-
grams, to establish minimum election administration standards for States
and units of local government with responsibilitY for the administration
of Federal elections, and for other purposes ....
HAVA created a four member advisory commission-the Election As-
sistance Commission (EAC)-and members were to be appointed by the
President to a four year term.22 As written into Section 209 of HAVA, "[t]he
Commission shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate any
regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any
State or unit of government, except to the extent permitted under section
1973gg-7a of this title., 23 This "advisory" only role for the EAC would
soon make it apparent that the EAC was doomed to living the life of a paper
tiger, for no state would voluntarily surrender its election law sovereignty to
this animal species.
Since 2004, the EAC has advised the states as to "best practices" ' 24 for
carrying out HAVA provisions and doled out over three billion dollars in
federal appropriations.25 Under HAVA Title I, the EAC has been responsible
21. H. R. REP. No. 107-730, pt. 1, at 1 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 15323 (Supp. 112002).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 15329 (Supp. 112002).
24. UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, Best Practices Tool Kit, availa-
ble at http://www.eac.gov/bp/docs/BestPracticesToolKit.doc, was revised in January 2006.
25. While most of this money did go to the states for the replacement of dated voting
machinery, HAVA under-funding has been a chronic problem. Speaking of these EAC fund-
ing woes, DeForest Soaries, the first EAC Chairman, said, "We really had to put together a
federal agency with spit, when that agency was supposed to bring about reforms in voting for
federal elections." See Tim Dickinson, The Voice of Voting Reform, ROLLING STONE:
20071
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for distributing money to states for improvements in the administration of
elections and to replace punch card and lever voting equipment.26 Title III
requirements have dealt with voting systems standards, provisional voting,
the creation of statewide voter registration lists, and the rights of disabled,
military, and overseas voters. 7
V. KEY HAVA PROVISIONS UNDER SCRUTINY
It is not apparent that the EAC, or Congress for that matter, fully un-
derstood the nation-wide ramifications of replacing punch card voting ma-
chines, lever voting machines, and paper ballots with electronic touch screen
voting equipment. As early as 1969, studies had surfaced which indicated
that computerized voting presented a whole host of security issues. 8
Coupled with electronic voting machine security is the issue of electronic
machine malfunctions. A substantial number of voting machine failures
were unveiled during the 2006 primary election season.2 9 Finally, there is
the issue of electronic voting maintenance costs. These maintenance ex-
penses have added significant financial burdens to already stretched state
budgets. 30 As a result of these increased election expenditures, the State of
NATIONAL AFFAIRS DAILY, June 6, 2006,
http://www.rollingstone.com/nationalaffairs/?p= 176.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15302 (Supp. 112002).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (Supp. 112002).
28. See ROY SALTMAN, INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION: ESSENTIAL ACTION To ASSURE
INTEGRITY IN THE VOTING PROCESS 4 (2006). Independent Verification, a report submitted to
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, contains a description of how fraudulent
voting software was used in a 1968 Los Angeles County, California experiment. For addi-
tional comments about security and reliability vulnerabilities see BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE AT N.Y. U. SCH. OF LAW, The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections In An
Electronic World, June 2006, available at
http://www.verifythevote.org/Docs/BrennanMachFullReport.pdf.
29. During installation, poll workers in Pender County, North Carolina, broke off voting
machine legs. In New Hanover County, North Carolina, touch-screen machines froze-up
while being assembled. See Veronica Gonzalez, Touch Screens Struggle to Get a Leg up
Over Paper Ballots, WILMINGTON STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), May 3, 2006, at B 1. Dan Bew-
ley, Glitch Hits Barry County Voting Machines, Wood TV8, http://www.woodtv.com. Bew-
ley describes the situation in Barry County, Michigan, where all of the ballots had to be
counted by hand because of a computer program glitch that caused the machines to scramble
the results. In suburban Cook County, Illinois, election officials reported that ten optical scan
and fifteen touch-screen machines experienced equipment failures, and that thirty to forty
other machines needed repairs. See John McCormick & James Janega, Voting Machine Woes
Force Ballot Backup," CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2006, at C28. Randolph County, Indiana's elec-
tion tabulation equipment malfunctioned, which left incomplete and possibly inaccurate vote
totals. See Voting Ran Smoothly in Wayne County, PALLADIUM-ITEM (Richmond, Ind.), May
3, 2006, at 3A.
30. Voting equipment maintenance "sticker shock" has been felt in most states and is
exemplified by the situation in the State of Utah. "I'm not sure any of us realized how much
684 [Vol. 29
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Florida announced in February of 2007 that they would abandon touch-
screen voting machines in favor of paper ballots scanned by machines." It is
a small wonder that Diebold, a leading voting machine vendor, is actively
considering the option of getting out of the election machine voting business
altogether.
3 2
As the 2006 election year cycle unfolded, it became increasingly clear
that in addition to problems with the installation of new electronic voting
equipment,33 there were other difficulties which plagued the implementation
of two more key state HAVA provisions: procedures for the administration
of elections34 and issues dealing with voting accessibility for several popula-
it is going to cost to own and operate this system," said Michael Cragun, elections director
for the Utah Lieutenant Governor's Office. Salt Lake County Clerk Sherrie Swensen now
spends $12,000 a month to store electronic voting machines and this past year spent an extra
$138,000 to pay for memory cards, batteries and other essential machine accessories. See
Matt Canham, E-vote Tab Adds up to Big Trouble, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 17, 2006.
31. Abby Goodnough & Christopher Drew, Florida to Shift Voting System With Paper
Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2007, at A17 (providing an account of Florida's shift to equipment
which will allow for a verified paper audit trail, but at a cost of $32.5 million). Maryland,
California, New Jersey, and Connecticut are at the forefront of a growing number of states
that may well join the bandwagon to ditch all touch-screen machines due to cost and security
concerns. Other states will have to figure out fixes that will allow for new audit capacity
demands.
32. M.R. Kropko, Diebold Weighs Strategy for Voting Unit, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 18,
2007. Diebold is one of the major players in the electronic voting machine world, but electibn
business only makes up about 8% of the revenue for this company noted for its focus on safes
and automated teller machines. The negative publicity surrounding electronic voting machine
security issues has had an adverse impact on sales to financial institutions and to the govern-
ment. As a result, Diebold has attempted to sell its voting technology business.
33. Getting machines purchased and deployed in time for the Spring 2006 elections was
a monumental project for the states. Once the machines were installed and the election soft-
ware programmed, electronic voting machine malfunctions, which occurred throughout much
of the country, made determining winners for the 2006 primary elections chaotic. Typical of
the experience encountered is the comment of one southern Indiana county clerk who said,
"It's the first time we've ever experienced a problem of this significance. It was a complete
failure of a new programming system." See Lesley Stedman Weidenbener, Primary Election
2006; State to Probe Computer Problems, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), May 4,
2006, at lB. Although there were less incidents of machine malfunctions during the Novem-
ber 2006 general election, national newspapers still reported problems in a number of states
including: Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. See Alan Coo-
perman and Amy Goldstein, Computer Glitches Frustrating Voters, WASH. POST, Nov. 7,
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/07.
34. Well into the 2006 election cycle, nearly a dozen states still were not in compliance
with the HAVA Title II, § 303 requirement that a computerized statewide voter registration
list be created. See December 21, 2005 Survey, National Association of Secretaries of State
(NASS) (on file with author). The accuracy and confidentiality of the databases already in
place also was challenged in a July 2006 NASS resolution which urged that "steps to improve
the accuracy of state voter registration databases" be taken. NAT'L Assoc. OF SEC'Y OF




tion groups.35 These problems have been magnified to such an extent that
the viability of the HAVA itself is called into question.36 How effective the
new 1 10th Democratic Congress will be in the enactment of meaningful
changes to HAVA and other substantive election law reform is still an un-
answered question.37 There is general cause for optimism,38 however, despite
%20Final%2OJuly/202006%2OVoter/2ORegistration%20Database%2OMaintenance.pdf
(2006).
35. HAVA Title III, § 301 requires voting be accessible for individuals with disabilities
and those citizens requiring alternative language assistance. Voter complaints are directed to
the Justice Department's Civil Rights Department hotline. Calls during the November 2006
election were a fraction of the calls made during the November 2004 balloting. See Terry
Frieden, Number of Civil Rights Voting Complaints "Low," CNN.com, Apr. 18, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/l 1/07/voting.doj/index.html (quoting one Justice De-
partment official as saying: "Nearly all of the civil rights and access problems dealt with
minority language voting issues.").
36. Richard Wolf, Election Glitches "Could Get Ugly," USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2006, at
1A (focusing national attention on the fact that 30% of the population would be using new
voting equipment in November 2006, and that inadequately trained poll workers (with an
average age of seventy-two) posed a technologically perilous situation).
37. Whether changes are made or not, Democrats appear to be talking about HAVA
reform talk. The spring 2007 kick off to the 2008 presidential campaign cycle has produced a
plethora of HAVA reform bills in Congress. Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton has submit-
ted the same substantive bill that she introduced in 2005: Count Every Vote Act of 2007, S.
804, 110th Cong. (2007). Illinois Senator Barack Obama introduced his Voter Advocate and
Democracy Index Act of 2007, S. 737, 110th Cong. (2007). Another reform bill, Voting
Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2007, S. 730, 110th Cong. (2007),
has been submitted by Senator Christopher Dodd, and Senator Bill Nelson has offered the
Vote Integrity and Verification Act of 2007. In the House of Representatives, New Jersey
congressman Rush Holt has enlisted an army of co-sponsors to sign onto his bill, Voter Con-
fidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007). In addition,
Senator Diane Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, has
chanted the election law reform mantra. Her February 14, 2007 letter to David Walker,
Comptroller General of the United States, focused on electronic voting system problems by
asking the GAO to investigate "models of Direct Recording Electronic voting systems that
are used in federal elections, but do not produce voter-verified paper ballots." Press Release,
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Asks Government Accountability Office to Investi-
gate Sarasota County Electronic Voting Systems (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/07releases/r-e-voting-fl.htm. Also, in a press release dated March
9, 2007, Senator Feinstein called on the Department of Veteran Affairs to provide veterans
being treated in VA facilities with assistance in registering to vote. Press Release, Sen. Di-
anne Feinstein, Chairman Feinstein Calls on Department of Veterans Affairs to Provide Voter
Registration Assistance (Mar. 9, 2007), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cnfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&Content
Record id=6b5c5ae4-98e3-4c67-37fb-407f92e4032e&Region id=&Issue id=. Finally, on
May 24, 2007, Senator Feinstein introduced the Ballot Integrity Act of 2007. This legislation
provides, in part, safeguards to prevent errors at the polls by requiring states to use voting
systems with voter-verified paper records by the federal 2010 elections. Press Release, Sen.
Dianne Feinstein, Senator Feinstein Introduces Comprehensive Reform Legislation to ensure
Accurate Counts in Federal Elections (May 25, 2007) available at
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the fact that two new EAC commissioners were confirmed by the newly
installed Congress in February 2007 without even the formality of a public
hearing.39
VI. HAVA'S IMPERFECT FUTURE?
Although the EAC allocated the last of its state funds-over $58 mil-
lion-to five states in 2006,40 most of the federal money to acquire new vot-
ing equipment already had been paid out by the end of December 2005. 4'
So, what does a governmental agency do when most of the money that it
once controlled has been distributed?42 The EAC's answer to this question in
2006 was to shift its attention and turn its focus to several secondary
changes. Future EAC efforts will now concentrate on improving voting sys-
tem technology, developing research and study initiatives in order to serve
as a national clearinghouse of election administration information, and man-
aging the federal funds distributed to the states for the replacement of dated
voting equipment and the implementation of computerized statewide voter
registration lists. In seeking to carry-out these responsibilities, the EAC un-
derstands the importance of keeping the general public informed about elec-
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&Cntent
Record id=C36F5F83-FBBF-A66A-2AE3-9D278DOF4E3C.
38. Memorandum from Ralph G. Neas, People for the American Way (Apr. 18, 2006),
available at
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid= 17890&print=yes&units-all. Mr.
Neas's memo indicated the probability of congressional action to remedy voting technology
problems, to strengthen measures that eliminate intimidation and deceptive voting tactics, and
to eliminate burdensome voter identification requirements.
39. 153 CONG. REC. S2115 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2007). These new commissioners are
Rosemary Rodriquez and Caroline Hunter. Id.
40. See 2006 U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM. ANN. REP. 22, available at
http://www.eac.gov/docs/EAC%20AR2006.pdf (hereinafter EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT).
41. Id.
42. It is possible that the short answer from some HAVA opponents would be to just go
away. Since initial funding for the EAC was established for a three year period only, it is
possible that this agency could be disbanded. Although an early supporter of HAVA, the
National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) began to see the EAC as a turf infringer.
In a February 2005 letter to members of Congress, NASS wrote that "[t]he secretaries believe
that allowing the EAC to evolve into a regulatory body is contrary to the spirit of HAVA, and
that by 2006 the EAC will have served its purpose. Congress should preserve the states'
ability to serve as independent laboratories of change through successful experiments and
innovation in election reform." Letter from NASS to Congress (Feb. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.nass.org/releases/EAC%20Position%2Cover/2OLtr.pdf. On April 24, 2007,
H.R.REP. NO. 110-107 (2007), was submitted. Although this conference report dealt with the
Iraq Accountability Act of 2007, (H.R. 1591, 110th Cong. (2007), Chapter 3, Section 4301
amended HAVA Section 102(a)(3)(B) to extend the expiration date of the EAC from January
1, 2006 to March 1, 2008.
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tion law issues and engaged in election law processes.43 A few observations
about these current and future EAC initiatives seem appropriate, for how
successful the EAC will be in meeting their renewed and invigorated charge
may well determine the future success of election law reform in the United
States.
A. Improvement of Voting Systems
Since the replacement of outdated voting equipment was a major thrust
of HAVA, and since most states did in fact replace their antiquated voting
equipment, the EAC has stepped forward to provide voting system guide-
lines and voting testing standards." These guidelines and standards were
promulgated in order to address the specific provisions of HAVA Section
301 which required voting systems to perform several functions, including
the following: allowing voters to review privately their selections; allowing
voters to correct their selections before casting a "final" vote; notifying vot-
ers when they had over-voted; providing for a verified permanent paper au-
dit trail; and providing individuals with disabilities or language accessibility
problems with the ability to vote independently and in private.4 5 It was im-
portant to have voting system guidelines and standards in place so that vot-
ing system security issues and voter-verified paper audit trail concerns could
be addressed, although the adoption of these guidelines and standards has
not necessarily allayed the fears of many in the election law world who are
unwilling to sign-off on either the reliability or security features of electron-
ic touch-screen voting machines.
Volume I of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)
deals with voting system performance guidelines,46 and the content of this
volume is described in the EAC Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report, as includ-
ing: "new requirements for accessibility, usability, voting system software
distribution, system setup validation, and wireless communications. It pro-
vides an overview of the requirements for independent verification systems,
including requirements for a voter-verified paper audit trail for States that
require this feature for their voting systems. 47
43. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 7.
44. On December 13, 2005, one of the HAVA goals was attained when the two volume
2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) were adopted. UNITED STATES ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM'N, 2005 VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES, Dec. 13, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.eac.gov/VVSG%20 (hereinafter VVSG).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (Supp. 112002).
46. See UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, supra note 44.
47. See EAC 2006 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 13.
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Volume II of the VVSG, entitled "National Certification Testing
Guidelines," '48 "describes the components of the national certification testing
process for voting systems, which will be performed by independent voting
system test labs accredited by EAC. 49 In July 2006, the EAC commission-
ers adopted the Voting System Testing and Certification Program," which
provides the information and procedures that manufacturers need in order to
test and certify HAVA voting requirements under § 231 (a)(1).51 In February
2007, the EAC accredited the first two voting system test labs: iBeta Quality
Assurance and Sys Test Labs. EAC Chair Donetta Davidson stated that
"[f]or the very first time, the federal government is in the business of testing
and certifying voting equipment and software." She added, "With these two
voting system test labs on board, we will begin the process of testing voting
equipment to ensure that these systems meet all of the requirements to en-
sure accurate and reliable elections."52
B. Assistance to States-Election Day Preparation
Anyone who voted during the past year undoubtedly experienced some
frustration in dealing with untrained poll workers, aggravation in using mal-
functioning voting equipment, or genuine disgust while waiting in line to get
a chance to cast an election ballot. Even though most states selected, pro-
cured, and set-up new voting equipment, that was no guarantee that the 2006
primary or general election would be conducted in a "hassle free" environ-
ment or run in a "professional manner."
Did the EAC attempt to come to the aid of those states which had im-
plemented new voting systems? The short answer is yes, but observing pri-
mary elections in ten states and sharing these observations along the way
48. VVSG, supra note 44.
49. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 13.
50. Id. at 14.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 15371 (Supp. 112002).
52. Press Release, United States Election Assistance Comm'n, Commission Accredits
Voting System Test Labs (Feb. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.eac.gov/news_022107.asp. The EAC worked closely with the Technical Guide-
lines Development Committee and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop these standards. In fiscal year 2007, these three groups "will revise sections of the
VVSG dealing with software, functional requirements and independent verification, and
security and will develop a comprehensive set of test suites or methods that can be used by
testing laboratories to review any piece of voting equipment on the market." See United
States Election Assistance Commission Testimony before the United States House Appropri-
ations Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Devel-





hardly qualifies for a good conduct medal.53 What kind of assistance for
election day preparation was provided? First, a series of Quick Start Man-
agement Guides,54 which provided an overview about how to effectively
manage and administer an election, were sent to election officials through-
out the nation.55 These guides included: "Quick Start Guide for New Voting
Systems," "Quick Start Guide for Ballot Preparation/Printing and Pre-
Election Testing," "Quick Start Guide for Voting System Security," and
"Quick Start Guide for Poll Workers."
Second, the EAC attempted to assist the states in recruiting the next
generation of poll workers. Title V of HAVA requires the EAC to establish
the Help America Vote College Program.56 Basically, this program encou-
rages college students to serve as nonpartisan poll workers. In fiscal year
2006, the EAC awarded a total of $300,000 in grants to various state colleg-
es and universities and other governmental entities. 7 The colleges, universi-
ties, and governmental bodies that received these grants were charged with
the responsibility to train college students as poll workers or poll assistants.
Typical of the grant recipients are Illinois Central College, which planned to
recruit and train fifty college students to be poll workers in Peoria County,
Illinois,"8 and Project Vote in Saginaw, Michigan, which planned to recruit
and train forty to fifty college student poll workers for the city of Saginaw. 9
53. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 16.
54. Actually these pamphlets are quite informative. It is too bad that the EAC was not
able to figure out a way to insure that this material was actually imparted to individual poll
workers. Perhaps the trickle-down theory does not work in the field of election law. But then
maybe it is not particularly beneficial to take the time to remind yourself or share the infor-
mation with others that you need to "keep it simple"-one of the points emphasized in the





55. These guides were probably sent out in September 2006, but the letter which was
sent to state and local election officials was dated October 19, 2006. This letter expressed the
sentiment that election officials might not be able to review the guides thoroughly, so nine of
the recommendations (out of the four guides provided) were specifically highlighted. This
letter is available at http://www.eac.gov/docs/revised%201etter/o20to%20election%20-
officials%20-%20Final.pdf.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 15521 (Supp. II 2002).
57. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 18.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 20.
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C. Assistance to States--Clearinghouse Activities: Research and Study
Initiatives
The duties and responsibilities of the EAC are very broad. The charge
given in § 202 of HAVA is that "[t]he Commission shall serve as a national
clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and review of
procedures with respect to the administration of Federal elections."6 In its
role as a "national clearinghouse" the EAC has begun to quicken its pace in
gathering information, compiling data, and in publishing reports and studies.
There are few areas of election processes, procedures, or activities where the
EAC has not already been involved or where the EAC does not plan to get
involved or engaged in the future. Generally, the EAC contracts with con-
sultants to engage in research that is then reported and published by the
EAC. This EAC involvement is represented in the following HAVA section
mandates and the EAC responses as illustrated by corresponding activities:
M Section 206 requires that reports be published via the Internet.6' Al-
though the current EAC web site received more than two million hits in fis-
cal year 2006,62 the site is being improved to include an election administra-
tion database containing statutes, regulations, rules, and court decisions.63 In
early 2007, a collection of recommendations is to be forwarded to local elec-
tion officials about how to set up and maintain effective voter information
web sites.64
* Section 241 mandates that election administration issues be studied
and information be made available to the public. 65 Encompassed within this
section is a charge to study or make information available about: methods
and mechanisms of election technology and voting systems; ballot designs;
methods of voter registration and provisional voting; methods of accessibili-
ty to voting; nationwide statistics about voting fraud; identifying, determin-
ing and investigating methods of voter intimidation; methods of recruiting,
training, and improving the performance of poll workers; best practice re-
ports; and assisting states and local authorities to improve the administration
of elections. In fiscal year 2004 the EAC inaugurated an election day sur-
vey, and currently data is being gathered to assemble the same report from
the November 2006 election. 66 Currently research is being conducted to de-
60. 42 U.S.C. § 15322 (Supp. 112002).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 15326 (Supp. 112002).
62. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 11-12. This site averaged more than
10,000 hits per day; the top page destinations included Register to Vote, the Election Day
Survey, and Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
63. Id. at 34.
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 15381 (Supp. I 2002).
66. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 33-35.
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velop best practices for vote count and recount procedures.67 Study projects
also are underway to research the current state of information on the topic of
voting fraud and voter intimidation.68 In fiscal year 2007, the results of a
study dealing with provisional voting and voter identification requirements
will be disseminated.69 In fiscal year 2006, the EAC awarded a contract for
67. Id. at 35.
68. Id. The EAC voting fraud and voter intimidation research caused an uproar in April
2007 when The New York Times published a series of articles on the subject. See Ian Urbina,
U.S. Panel Is Said to Alter Finding on Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at Al; Eric
Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2007, at Al. Although the EAC has not publicly issued the consultant report on voting fraud
and voter intimidation, The New York Times leaked a draft "predecisional-not for distribu-
tion" report on April 11, 2007. A copy of the draft report is available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/2007041 1voters-draftreport.pdf. While
Democrats have questioned whether the consultant's report was altered and complained about
the delay in getting this report distributed, the EAC earlier issued their own public version of
the voting fraud and voter intimidation report. See UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMM'N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY,
(2006) available at
http://www.eac.gov/docs/Voter/o20Fraud%20&%201ntimidation%2OReport%20-
POSTED.pdf. The official EAC report on voting fraud and voter intimidation appears to be a
fairly accurate summary of the consultant report, and the report provides the rationale as to
why only some of the consultant report recommendations were embraced. Of this report
controversy, Commissioner Gracia Hillman, a Democratic member of the commission, stated
that "[w]e were confronted with the dilemma of a report that had too little research for the
consultants' recommendations. The consensus we reached was to produce our own report but
to include all of the consultants' background research, summaries of interviews, and summa-
ries of cases reviewed." Press Release, United States Election Assistance Comm'n, Statement
by Commissioner Gracia Hillman United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
Regarding Release of Voter Fraud Consultant Report (Apr. 16, 2007) available at
http://www.eac.gov/docs/04-16-
07%20STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER_GRACIAHILLMAN.pdf.
69. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 35. In fact, the EAC delay in distribut-
ing the voter identification requirements report was the catalyst that brought Congressional
investigators in the fray. EAC Chair Donetta Davidson appeared before the House Appropria-
tions Subcommittee on Financial Services in March 2007 and was directed to release a June
28, 2006 consultant report entitled Report to the United States Election Assistance Commis-
sion on Best Practices to Improve Voter Identification Requirements. When the EAC issued
this report from the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University on March 30, 2007,
Chairman Davidson stated that "[a]fter careful consideration of the initial research, the
Commission decided this important issue deserves a more in-depth research approach, and
that it should be examined beyond only one election cycle .... The Commission and our
contractor agree that the research conducted for EAC raises more questions than provides
answers." Press Release, United States Election Assistance Comm'n, EAC to Launch Com-
prehensive Study of Voter ID Laws (Mar. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.eac.gov/news_033007.asp. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Richard Durbin sent a
letter to Chairman Davidson on April 13, 2007 and requested a response to "very troubling
news reports that included allegations that the Commission may have altered or delayed
release of two tax-payer funded studies of election issues for political purposes." Press Re-
lease, Sens. Dianne Feinstein & Richard Durbin, Senators Feinstein and Durbin Seek Re-
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the development of effective ballot designs and polling place signage. Ballot
designs and polling place signage were piloted during the November 2006
election, and a best practices for ballot design and polling place signage will
be unveiled by mid-2007.7° Additionally, effective administration of federal
elections means that the EAC assists states in making voting materials avail-
able in eight or more languages for voters with limited English proficiency.7'
M Section 242 requires that the EAC conduct a study on the best prac-
tices for facilitating voting by absent uniformed services voters and overseas
voters72 in compliance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 1986.7 ' The EAC is engaged in collecting com-
prehensive state data on all ballots sent and received by UOCAVA voters,
and survey instruments were developed in 2004 and 2006 for this purpose.
74
Education instruction about HAVA requirements and the UOCAVA are
being directed at state and local election authorities on a continual basis. 75
M Section 244 directs the EAC to study and report on voters who regis-
ter by mail and the effect of the use of social security information in the
electoral process.76 Congress wanted an analysis made of the impact that
election administration changes would have on voter registration and the
accuracy of verification procedures and voter rolls. The feasibility of using
social security identification numbers to establish voter registration re-
quirements also was to be studied. 77 The 2006 EAC Administration and Vot-
ing Survey utilized an online web survey instrument to collect data about
sponse from EAC Regarding Allegations of Altered or Delayed Studies (Apr. 13, 2007),
available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cffm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&Content
Record id=eca9lbbc-022f-ab2a-cc0d-f7cfdOdb8501. Senator Feinstein also scheduled a June
13, 2007 Senate Committee on Rules and Administration Committee oversight hearing on the
EAC. Id. Chairman Davidson responded to the controversy surrounding EAC research stu-
dies by issuing a formal request to the Commissions inspector general "to conduct a review
of the commission's contracting procedures, including a review of two recent projects focus-
ing on voter identification and vote fraud and voter intimidation." Press Release, United
States Election Assistance Commission, EAC Requests Review of Voter ID, Vote Fraud, and





71. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 36.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 15382 (Supp. 112002).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff (Supp. 112002).
74. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 31.
75. Id.




voter registration, identification procedures, and voter turnout sources for
the November 2006 election.7"
E Section 245 provides that the EAC is to conduct a study of the issues
and challenges related to electronic voting and election processes.79 While
Congress seemed interested in the benefits of Internet technology to im-
prove voter participation rates and voter education, the potential for election
fraud in the federal, state, and local election process also was to be ex-
amined.80 The EAC will soon receive a best practices report regarding voter
information web sites. Recommendations will then be made to election offi-
cials about how to set up and maintain effective voter information web
sites.8" A tie-in to election fraud issues is already underway.
N Section 246 charges the EAC with the responsibility to study the es-
tablishment of a free absentee ballot postage program.82 This initiative
would have the EAC and the Postal Service conduct a study on the feasibili-
ty and advisability of establishing a program to waive or reduce the amount
of postage applicable with respect to absentee ballots submitted by voters
for general federal elections. The EAC is currently gathering information to
be included in an absentee ballot survey, but it is not clear whether the issue
of free absentee ballot postage will be addressed. 3
D. HAVA Funds-Distribution and Management
Although the distribution of HAVA funds to the states has been pre-
viously discussed, 4 the bottom-line is that the EAC paid out all of the re-
quired funds in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006.85 The EAC has now
turned its focus to answering questions by election administrators about the
use of HAVA funds. A list of frequently asked questions about reporting
requirements and rules regarding the proper use of HAVA funds also has
been prepared. This document is available on-line and "covers topics such
as accounting procedures, rules regarding equipment, [and] income from
HAVA funds.
8 6
The EAC oversees three sources of HAVA funding as set out in §§
101, 102, and 251. Section 101 funds can be used to comply with the Title
78. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 33.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 15385 (Supp. H 2002).
80. Id.
81. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 34.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 15386 (Supp. II 2002).
83. UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, Absentee Ballots Report, available
at http://www.eac.gov/absentee-survey.asp?format=none.
84. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
85. The requirement payment mandate is found in § 251 of HAVA and at 42 U.S.C. §
15401 (Supp. 112002).
86. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 22.
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III requirements to improve the administration of elections by educating
voters, training poll workers, developing state plans, and improving the ac-
cessibility of polling places.8 7 Section 102 funds were to be used to replace
punch card and lever voting systems.8 Section 251 funds were used to pro-
cure or upgrade voting systems, to implement provisional voting, to post
required voting information at the polling place, and to create a state-wide
voter registration list. 9 All states are required to report annually to the EAC
on the use of HAVA Title I, § 101, and Title II, § 251 funds. The thirty
states that received Title II, § 102 funds to replace voting equipment also
must report on the use of those funds.9"
As part of its HAVA management responsibility, the EAC is embark-
ing on a plan to recoup HAVA § 102 funds from those states that took fund-
ing to replace punch card and lever voting machines but failed to use the
funds to replace these machines by the January 1, 2006 deadline.9' States are
now engaged in a process to certify which precincts did in fact replace all
punch card or lever machines by the applicable date. This certification
process is expected to be completed by early summer 2007, and then the
EAC will redistribute returned funds as requirements payments to other
states.92
In addition to the EAC's role in allocating and managing HAVA funds,
the commission also is responsible for monitoring the use of funds by the
states as stipulated in § 902.9" In 2005, the EAC adopted a general policy for
conducting special audits that applied to all states. 94 These audits are con-
ducted under the direction of the EAC's Office of Inspector General.95
Based upon audit results, states will be required to repay funds disbursed
and be given added reporting chores.96
So, what does a governmental agency do when most of the money that
it once controlled has been distributed? Plenty. And it appears that the EAC
has been engaged in plenty of meaningful activities: improving voting sys-
tems; assisting states with election day preparations; engaging in research
and study "clearinghouse" functions; and in managing and auditing HAVA
funds. Are there improvements that could be made to HAVA, the EAC, and
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 25-26.
90. Id. at 26.
91. Id. The EAC has little discretion regarding this issue since HAVA § 102(d) requires
states that have not met the deadline to "repay a portion of the § 102 funds equal to a percen-
tage of the noncompliant precincts." Id.
92. EAC 2006 Annual Report, supra note 40, at 25.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 15542 (Supp. 112002).
94. EAC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 30.
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to our national electoral administration process? Sure, and that is the topic
for the next part of this essay.
VII. THOUGHTS ON ELECTION LAW REFORM
If there are any topics that United States citizens think often about and
exhibit great passion for, election law reform is not generally among those
topics. Even law students do not usually flock to election law courses, pre-
ferring instead to take bar exam offerings in anticipation of their eventual
rendezvous with destiny-that time in the summer when the world stands
still while a state bar exam is administered. But election law professors are a
different story. They do think about election law processes and election law
reform--often developing a deep and an abiding passion for the subject.
Perhaps I have always had an interest in American politics and gov-
ernment (I doubt that anyone could obtain a masters degree in political
science without at least feigning such interest), so surveying the election law
landscape the past several years has been like reminiscing with old friends.
Indeed, I have been reminded of the importance of the Voting Rights Act,
amazed at the intricacies of districting criteria, intrigued by the concept of
minority vote dilution, fascinated by the ingenuity of those who have
created racial and partisan gerrymanders, surprised by the impediments that
are placed in the way of those who would be third-party contenders, dis-
gusted with the conduct of those who have drunk too deeply from the public
trough, and perplexed by the complexity of campaign finance law.
This is not my first attempt to set out some suggestions for election law
reform,97 but each time that words are strung together and put down on pa-
per, I have become more firmly convinced that election law and election law
reform ought to be in the thoughts and hearts of each and every citizen. This
conclusion must be reached, for election law processes undergird the foun-
dation of our republic, and there is much in the processes themselves that is
worth reforming.
VIII. SUGGESTED REFORMS
The following election law reform suggestions are offered by one who
was involved in the nuts and bolts of political party activity for nearly three
decades, but who now has the luxury of thinking about elections rather than
"doing" elections. While these suggestions may have general nation-wide
applicability, some reform proposals may be better instituted within particu-
lar states or local jurisdictions. What is proffered as commentary on reform
is not directed solely at reforming HAVA, because the EAC already seems
97. See Cihak & Springman, supra note 8.
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well aware of what can be done to improve their own backyard, but the
measures suggested here only serve to illustrate the wide expanse of issues
that now cover the election law terrain.
98
A. Enact Legislation Granting One State Entity the Power to Oversee
Election Laws
As earlier described in this writing, United States election law is con-
structed with a tripartite mold. The federal government has a role to play in
the electoral process, as do the states and the judiciary. While allowing fed-
eral and judiciary participation may raise cautionary flags for those who feel
that our democracy is being compromised by building this partnership, the
reality is that states can no longer effectively manage the electoral process
by flying solo. The costs are too great, and the stakes are too high. Continu-
ing to allow states to do their own election law thing, with no real federal
oversight, would insure that exercising the right to vote remains only a
dream for many.
It was inevitable that some organization had to be created to pull the
election law players together. So HAVA was the legislation that attempted
to strike a balance between reserving traditional authority over election law
mechanics for the states, and delegating administrative powers to a federal
agency. This federal agency would attempt to keep the United States elec-
tion law train moving in one direction and away from major train wrecks.
That no detailed map was provided makes sense. HAVA provides paint and
paint brushes, but state election officials must do the actual painting.
Most states have scores of counties and in most states the power and
authority to run elections defaults to the lowest common denominator-the
counties. It is no wonder that ballot designs and election law signage is not
consistent between counties and more often not even consistent within coun-
ties. Partisan politics also needs to be removed from the state election law
equation, so a non-partisan or a reformed partisan should be appointed as a
state "Election Law Czar." Then the job becomes one of getting the various
counties, towns, and cities to embrace a new way of election law living. So
this suggestion is for state legislators-enact legislation that grants one state
entity the power to oversee state election laws.
98. Just as there is no end to the number of election reforms that could be proposed,
there is no end to the number of groups and organizations that offer election reform propos-
als. For one report that has been published recently see a March 7, 2007 Brennan Center For
Justice at NYU School of Law and Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights Under Law publi-
cation entitled, An Agenda For Election Refonn. WENDY R. WEISER & JONAH GOLDMAN, AN




B. Get More Citizens Involved in the Election Process
For several months I have thought about a request that a representative
of our Black Law Student Association (BLSA) made. I was asked to speak
to BLSA a couple of months before the November 2006 election, and the
topic given to me was "Why Should I Vote?" I was taken back a bit by be-
ing asked to address this particular topic. If any group should know the val-
ue of voting should not a group of black law students know? Then I realized
that a new generation had been born that had not heard the old stories from
hundreds of years ago, or that had not experienced first hand more recent
events from the 1960s. So I spoke and my one word theme was:
HERITAGE!
It is good practice to market our system of government to citizens at an
early age-and the earlier the better. Years ago, I was involved with Kids
Voting Kentucky. As part of a law library group, I helped staff two precincts
during the election day. Youngsters would accompany their parents to these
voting precincts and then cast their mock ballots. They would walk away
with a piece of candy in their hands and a smile on their faces. Perhaps older
students could be registered to vote at the time of high school graduation, or
the voting age itself could be lowered to sixteen and new drivers could be
registered when they applied for a driver's license.
Also, the enthusiasm of college students needs to be tapped into. Cam-
pus events, social activities, and a myriad of workshops all provide fertile
ground for waving "the register to vote" flag. HAVA has already established
a "Help America Vote College Program," which is worthy of replication and
continued funding.99 In my estimation, unless we hook these future citizen
leaders, our nation's social fabric will continue to unravel.
There is one other citizen group that needs to get more involved in the
electoral process--ex-felons who may still be disenfranchised. Senator Hil-
lary Clinton has introduced the Count Every Vote Act of 2007.1°° While this
bill focuses on several election administration issues, civic participation in
the political process by ex-offenders is a key provision, since well over five
million individuals currently cannot vote due to felony convictions. Senator
Clinton's bill would restore voting rights to those who are no longer on pa-
role or probation-those who have fully served their sentences. In the lan-
guage of the bill:
99. Help America Vote Act of 2002, §§ 501, 502, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15521, 15522 (Supp. II
2002).
100. S. 804, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl 10-804> (amending the Help America




The right of an individual who is a citizen of the United States to vote in
any election for Federal office shall not be denied or abridged because
that individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless, at the
time of the election, such individual (1) is serving a felony sentence in a
correctional institution or facility; or (2) is on parole or probation for a
felony offense. 101
There are few good reasons, and no sound public policy arguments, for
keeping those who have repaid their debt to society away from election pol-
ling sites. State laws need to be changed in order to allow ex-offenders to
once again participate in the political process.
C. Provide More Poll Worker Training
There is little doubt that recent election law changes have stretched to
the limit the ability of an election administration process to deal effectively
with technological change. The president of a California voter foundation
has remarked, "[W]e're reaching the limit of reasonable expectations of
what poll workers can do. County registrars have to grab who they can, and
they're reluctant to be critical since that could result in even fewer work-
ers."' 2 The problem is really one of two few poll workers and too little poll
worker training.
Senator Clinton's 2007 election reform legislation provides a laundry
list of required training topics for poll workers,' 3 and a bill introduced by
Senator Christopher Dodd establishes minimum standards for the number of
poll workers. °4 Yet the issue is not really what training should occur or the
number of poll workers that should be trained. The real problem is the quali-
ty of the training itself. Any poll worker training that I have been associated
with is worse than inadequate-it is abysmal. Yes, mandatory annual train-
ing for election officials and poll workers should be instituted. But some
kind of certification process also needs to be put in place to help insure that
all election workers know, understand, can interpret, and will implement
state and federal election laws.
101. Id. at Title VII § 701 (d).
102. See John Wildermuth, Touch-screen Voting's Steep Learning Curve: Rollout in 21
Counties Brings Glitches, S. F. CHRON., June 19, 2006, at B 1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/06/19/BAG8QJGDBLI .DTL.
103. S. 804 at 60. The training topics to be covered include: accommodating individuals
with disabilities, requirements for the identification of voters, the appropriate use of provi-
sional ballots, registering voters on election day, and training on security procedures. One
positive note regarding the training to be offered is the emphasis on "hands-on" training.
104. S. 730, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill-s 110-730 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
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D. Purchase Additional Touch-Screen Voting Machines
In the present environment it is not popular to advocate the purchase of
more electronic touch-screen voting machines-this is one area in which
most Republicans and Democrats can agree. I believe, however, that at least
one touch-screen voting machine should be available at each and every pol-
ling site in this country. Why? Because touch-screen equipment is already
familiar to most Americans in one form or another-just stop by any ATM
or self check-out line at a supermarket and see for yourself-and these ma-
chines are easy to use. The bottom-line, however, is that touch-screen voting
provides the type of private access to the electoral process needed for those
individuals with disabilities.
Security issues are the main drawback now in using touch-screen vot-
ing. I am convinced that fixes could be designed to repair any real or im-
agined technological glitches. Nevertheless, we do need to make certain that
equipment and software is not tampered with. Some kind of certification
process also should be required. Verified voter paper audit trails need to be
employed, and mandatory audit provisions must be put in place. 1°5 I have
voted on lever machines, paper ballots, scanned paper ballots, and touch-
screen voting machines. I will take the touch-screen voting alternative any-
time. And yes, I even look forward to voting via the Internet someday. Elec-
tion law technology deserves a fair chance to work before we throw the ba-
by out with the bath water.
E. Implement Ballot Reform Measures
There are a couple of ballot reform measures that should be enacted.
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is one of the best options. This measure would
negate the need to hold costly and time-consuming runoff elections. Instant
runoff voting (or ranked choice voting as it is often referred to) allows vot-
ers to rank candidates on the ballot in order of their preference. Candidates
can then be eliminated without the need of a runoff election. IRV is already
used in Arkansas and a number of other states for military and overseas vot-
ers.1°6 Instant runoff voting is in general use in several jurisdictions in Mich-
105. Audit provisions are major components of bills introduced in the 110th Congress.
S.559, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-559>. For similar legislation intro-
duced in the House by Congressman Rush Holt see H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007), available
at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-811>.
106. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-406 (2005). Instant runoff voting (IRV) is described in
this section of the code. The instructions explain that a voter indicates "his or her order of
preference for each candidate for each office." Voters "put the number one next to the name
of the candidate who is the voter's first choice, and the number two for the voter's second
choice, and so forth .... Id. IRV for military voters is also used in South Carolina and Loui-
[Vol. 29
HAVA: UNMET EXPECTATIONS
igan, California, Vermont, Maryland and North Carolina.0 7 In 2007, IRV
legislation was introduced in Colorado, Minnesota, Washington, Maine,
Arizona, Arkansas, Oregon, Hawaii, and New York.' ° There are no real
minuses involved in supporting IRV legislation.
Voting-by-mail is another great ballot reform proposal. Mail-in voting
offers several advantages including: a reduction in cost, increased voter par-
ticipation, easier election administration, and it gives voters a longer oppor-
tunity to study the ballot. One down-side to this device is that the integrity
and secrecy of the ballot process could be called into question should some
coercive or manipulative pressures be brought to bear on a voter. The other
potential minus is the fact that voters may learn new revelations about can-
didates after ballots have been mailed, but this criticism could be leveled at
an early voting measure.' °9 Voting-by-mail has now been adopted in a num-
ber of states.1 ' Oregon moved exclusively to this method of voting in
2000.11 The following passage sums up the advantages for supporting mail-
in voting:
No poll workers includes: no recruitment; no notices to be sent; no
classes to conduct; no distribution and retrieval of election day supplies;
no last-minute cancellations from workers who had agreed to serve; no
paychecks to cut and mail; no W-2's to send; no pre-dawn election-day
hours to line up replacement workers. No polling places includes no pol-
ling place leases, telephones, utilities; no searching for or preparation of
accessible locations; no frantic phone calls about locked doors; no prepa-
ration, set-up, tear-down, or emergency repairs of voting machines or
devices; no confusion about where people must go to vote." 
2
F. Solicit Customer Service Feedback
Election officials ought to solicit voter "customer service" feedback re-
garding a voter's experience at polling sites during election day." 3 Election
siana. See The Center for Voting and Democracy, FairVote,
http://fairvote.org/?page=27&pressmode=showspecific&showarticle=l 51 [hereinafter Center
for Voting and Democracy, Fairvote].
107. Center for Voting and Democracy, Fairvote.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id. States allowing mail-in voting at one level or another include: Colorado, Florida,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Washing-
ton.
111. Michael Hanmer & Michael Traugott, The Impact of Voting By Mail On Voter Be-
havior, 32 AM. POL. REs. 375 (2004) (discussing the Oregon experience).
112. See The Center for Voting and Democracy, FairVote,
http://www.fairvote.org/tumout/mail.htm.
113. See Cihak & Springman supra note 8, at 41.
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officials should welcome this feedback just like other customer service or-
ganizations welcome negative or positive feedback. So give voters a cus-
tomer satisfaction survey to fill out. Ask voters to rate how they were
treated, what their experience felt like, and whether the process of voting at
their poll site met their expectations. Perceptions really do matter. Use the
feedback garnered as a springboard for improving the voting experience at
each polling site. There really is no other way that voting experiences can be
improved without voter input.
Senator Barack Obama has gained some positive press by introducing
legislation entitled, Voter Advocate and Democracy Index Act of 2007.114
Obama's legislation creates an "Office of the Voter Advocate" within the
EAC and requires that certain voting data be gathered including how long
voters wait in line to vote, the numbers of voters who appeared at the wrong
polling place, the rate of voter ballots discarded, the number of election day
complaints, and the rate of voting system malfunctions." 5 Mr. Obama's leg-
islation goes a step further by creating a "democracy index." His democracy
index would compile the information gathered from the states and then
compare and rank the states across all categories of voter data."6 An inter-
esting twist is the fact that Senator Hillary Clinton has now called for a
"democracy index" in her 2007 version of the Count Every Vote Act. Sena-
tor Clinton's 2005 bill, by a similar name, did not include this provision.
IX. CONCLUSION
The title of this essay is "The Help America Vote Act: Unmet Expecta-
tions?" I suppose the argument could be made that HAVA has not lived up
to all of the expectations touted by the proponents of this legislation. The
114. S. 737, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 110-737.
115. Id. at Part 4, § 223(c).
116. Id. at § 224. Senator Obama's call for a "democracy index" is probably borrowed
from Professor Heather Gerken of Yale Law School. I heard Professor Gerken call for the
utilization of a "democracy index" at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools in Washington, D.C. in January 2007. My own call for soliciting customer
service feedback is based on my years of working in law school libraries and emphasizing the
need to treat library patrons liked valued customers. While I believe that a "democracy in-
dex" should be mandated, I also would like to hand out to voters a customer service satisfac-
tion survey and see how they really felt about their voting experience. For the November
2006 general election, I did distribute to some law students and the local League of Women
Voters a limited number of voter checklists or surveys. These surveys dealt with HAVA and
Arkansas polling place signage requirements and compliance with accessibility provisions for
individuals with disabilities. The final question in these surveys asked voters to rate their
voting experience-fair, good or, excellent-and included space for more detailed feedback.




issue as to whether the EAC has been able to achieve everything on its
agenda also could be raised. HAVA and the EAC are not without warts, but
any blemishes that may exist have been open to public view, consideration,
and scrutiny. The EAC has been operational only since 2004, and three
years is a very short time in which to determine whether any organization,
and especially any government agency, has fulfilled its charge and met the
expectations of its clients.
Although the role that HAVA and the EAC plays in assisting states to
improve voting systems and in making elections more reflective of the will
of a majority of our citizens was defined by Congress in 2003, this is really
not a new election law role. The fact remains that many of the functions and
responsibilities now performed by the EAC were performed earlier by the
Office of Election Assistance, then a department of the Federal Election
Commission. It is apparent that there remains a continued need for some
federal agency to step up to the plate and oversee the election process in this
country. Has the EAC done this-moved up to the plate and banged out
some hits? Time will tell.
The future success of HAVA and of the EAC will be largely dependent
upon the progress made to amend the original HAVA legislation and to
strengthen the mandate given to the EAC to fulfill its mission. Reforms need
to be made in the design and implementation of voting systems and in the
administration of election procedures and processes. Fail-safe voting must
be assured and carried out in a secure environment. Measures ought to be
taken to expand the voting franchise so that it reaches out to all citizens.
Voters are the heart and soul of the electoral process. Let's treat them as
such. State governments have had long enough to reform their own electoral
processes. It is time for them to get on the HAVA/EAC bandwagon.
Regardless of what reform measures are enacted or what governmental
entity carries out these reforms, the bottom-line is that our individual citi-
zens need to get more involved in the workings of our government. As
stakeholders, citizens must vote in each and every election. I am still
haunted by the implications of one statistic that was reported by Desha
County, Arkansas after the November 2006 general election. Only 9.76% of
the voters in Desha County voted in November 2006, even though there was
a competitive gubernatorial race. The fact that this county has a large Afri-
can-American population also is troubling. Legislators, administrators, and
election officials must figure out how to capture the attention of the next
generation of voters. For unless they do so, our nation's future could be put
at risk.
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